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addresses a fundamental issue in the lives
of all citizens, the power of a private
citizen to sue a state to make it obey the
federal Constitution. For if the citizens
may not sue a state to compel
compliance with federal laws. those
fundamental liberties which we hold dear
may be in jeopardy. This Note will
discuss the recent landmark United
States Supreme Court decision,
Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida
(Seminole Tribe), in which a 5-4 Court
relied on the Eleventh Amendment to
assert that Congress is barred from
authorizing private parties to sue the
states in federal court without the states'
consent.' This departure from existing
law and its possibly far-reaching impact
on environmental litigation, will be the
focus of this Note. The Court "has
recognized that the general problem of
environmental harm is often not
susceptible to a local solution."' If such
is the case. what does the instant
decision mean for the future of
environmental law?
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In September 1991. the
Seminole Tribe of Florida (Seminole)
filed this action against the State of
Florida and its Governor (Florida),
invoking jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(A). the Indian Gaming
Allowing States To Avoid Accountability:
A Death Knell For Private Enforcement Of Federal
Environmental Laws?
SeImole Tribe of Florida v Florida'
by Melissa McAllister
' 116 S.Ct. 1114(1996).
2 Id. at 1133. Note, with respect to civil rights suits that derive from Fourteenth Amendment claims, Congress is not barred from authorizing
private parties to sue the states in federal court -without the states' consent. Id. at 1125.
'Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1. 3 (1989)(citing Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978)).
4 Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 112 1. "The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that an Indian tribe may conduct certain gaming activities only
in conformance with a valid compact between the Tribe and the State in which the gaming activities are located...The Act, passed under the
Indian Commerce Clause..., imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of a
compact..., and authorizes a Tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty..." Id. at 1119.
Id. at 1121. 28 U.S.C. § § 1331 and 1362 grant to the district courts original jurisdiction with respect to those civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, that is federal questions, and original jurisdiction of all civil actions. brought by an
Indian tribe or band with a goveming body duly recognized by the Secretary of the Interior, in any controversy arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States, respectively.
61(/. The facts which led to Seminole's allegations are as follows:
In January 1991, Seminole requested of Florida's Governor "the commencement of negotiations, pursuant to IGRA. for a tribal-state
compact governing the conduct of class III gaming activities on tribal lands. On March 4, 1991, the Tribe submitted a proposed compact
providing for tribal operation of poker. and all video, electronic and computer-aided games which duplicate poker, bingo. pull-tabs, lotto,
punchboards, tip jars, instant bingo and other games similar to bingo... On May 24. 1991, the Governor's General Counsel responded for
the Governor, rejecting all of the Tribe's proposed games with the exception of poker... [Following requests for reconsideration and the
submission of legal memorandum to Florida, providing support for the proposed compact provisions], [i]n August 1991, the Governor's
General Counsel reasserted that the State would not negotiate regarding any fonn of gaming not expressly allowed by State statutes, nor
would the State negotiate regarding any machine gaming or any forn ofcasino gaming. The State expressed a willingness to negotiate only
poker and other card games, raffles, parimutuel wagering on dog and horse racing. and jai alai. Tribal and State representatives met in
September 1991 , but the State refused to change its position regarding the scope ofthe negotiations."
Brief for Petitioner at 7, 1995 WL 143442.
' Id.
'Id. Motion denied at 801 F.Supp. 655, 655 (S.D.Fla. 1992).
' Id.
loll1 F.3d 1016, 1018 (llth Cir. 1994).
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Regulatory Act (IGRA). and 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1362.s Seminole
contended that Florida had violated the
good faith negotiation requirement
contained in § 2710(d)(3) by refusing
to enter into any negotiation for
inclusion of particular gaming activities
in a tribal-state compact.' Florida
moved to dismiss the complaint, alleging
that the suit was violative of the State's
sovereign immunity from suit in federal
court.' The district court denied the
motion.' from which Florida took an
interlocutory appeal.'
The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district
court's decision, holding that the
Eleventh Amendment barred Seminole's
suit against Florida."o The Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that
in § 2710(d)(7) Congress had clearly
intended to abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity; and that the IGRA
had been passed pursuant to Congress'
power under the Indian Commerce
Clause. However the Eleventh Circuit
Vol. 4*No. 3
disagreed with the district court. holding
that under the Indian Commerce Clause,
Congress did not have the power to
abrogate a State's Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit" The Eleventh
Circuit also held that the doctrine of Ex
parte Young'2 does not permit an Indian
tribe to compel good faith negotiation
by bringing a suit against the Governor
of a State." Due to its lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, the appellate court
remanded to the district court with
directions to dismiss Seminole's suit.14
Seminole sought review of the
Eleventh Circuit's decision, and the
United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari." The United States Supreme
Court, in a five-to-four decision
affirming the Eleventh Circuit's
dismissal of petitioner's suit. held (i)
Congress lacked authority under the
Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity and (ii) the doctrine of Ex
parte Young did not apply to suits
against a state official for prospective
injunctive relief to enforce the good faith
bargaining requirement of the IGRA. "
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Indian Commerce Clause"
and the IGRA8
The Indian Commerce Clause
of the United States Constitution
recognizes that Congress shall have the
power "Itlo regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several
States. and with the Indian tribes." 9
Congress, through its passage of the
IGRA in 1988, pursuant to the Indian
Commerce Clause. sought to provide a
statutory basis for the operation and
regulation of gaming by Indian tribes.2 0
The IGRA provides for three classes of
gaming on Indian lands. with a different
regulatory scheme for each class. Class
III gaming. relevant to the instant
decision, is defined as "all forms of
gaming that are not class I gaming or
class 11 gaming,"' including slot
machines. electronic games of chance.
casino games. poker. lotio. and the
like.22 Among other requirements. the
IGRA provides that Class Ill gaming
shall be lawful only where it is
"'Aconducted in conformance with a
Tribal-State compact entered into by the
Indian tribe and the State under
paragraph (3) that is in effect." 23
"Paragraph (3)" to which § 2710(d)(1)
refers is § 2710(d)(3). which describes
the scope of a Tribal-State compact 24
and recognized judicial enforceability
with respect to the State's obligation to
make good faith negotiations with the
Indian tribe by § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) and
(B3)(i ).2
The IGRA also sets forth a
remedial scheme in order to ensure the
formation of a Tribal-State compact.2 6
Section 271 0(d)(7)(B)(i i) provides that
in any, action brought by a Tribe under
" Id. at 1019.
12 The doctrine ofExpante Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in certain instances, provides for a lifling ofthe Eleventh Amendment bar, in order
to allow a suit against a state officer.
" Seninole, 11 F.3d at 1029.
4 Id.
" Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1122.
6 Id. at 1133.
U.S. CONsT., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
8 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2701-2721 (1988).
' U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20 See 25 U.S.C. § 2702.
2 25 U.S.C. § 2703(8).
22 Class I gaming is defined as "social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional fonus of Indian gaining engaged in by
individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations" and such gaining is of the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Indian tribes. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6). Class II gaming includes bingo. games similar to bingo. nonbanking card gaies not illegal under the
laws of the State, and card games operated in States prior to the passage of the IGRA. See 25 IJ.S.C. § 2703(7). Class 11 gaining activities
are primarily left to tribal self-regulation. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(cx3)-(6).
2325 U.S.C. § 271 0(d)(1). To be lawful, Class II gaming must also be authorized by an ordinance or resolution and located in a state that
permits such gaining.
14See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3XA). Section 271 0(d)(3) provides in relevant part:
(A) any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a class l gaining activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted,
shall request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact
governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to
enter into such a compact.
" See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7)(AXi) and (BXi). Section 271 0(d)(7)(A)(i) and (B)(i) provides:
(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over-
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for the
purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under paragraph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith...
(B)(i) An Indian tribe may initiate a cause of action described in subparagraph (A)(i) onlv alter the close of the 180-day period beginning
on the date on which the Indian tribe requested the State to enter into negotiations under paragraph (3XA).
"See25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7Xll3Xii)-(vii).
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§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i), the Tribe must
demonstrate that a Tribal-State compact
has not been entered into and that the
State did not respond in good faith to
the Indian tribe's request to negotiate.
at which point the burden of proof shifts
to the State to show that it has
negotiated in good faith." "If the court
finds that the State has failed to
negotiate in good faith with the Indian
tribe to conclude a Tribal-State
compact. [the court is directed tolorder
the State and the Indian tribe to conclude
such a compact within a 60-day
period."2 1 If after the 60-day period. no
compact has been concluded. "the
Indian tribe and the State shall each
submit to a mediator appointed by the
court a proposed compact that
represents their last best offer for a
compact."2 1 The mediator is directed
to choose between the two proposed
compacts. select "the one which best
comports with the terms of [the IGRA]
and any other applicable Federal law and
with the findings and order of the
court."s0 and submit it to the State and
the Indian tribe." If the State consents
to the proposed compact within the 60-
day period beginning on the date on
which the mediator submits the
proposed compact, said compact is
"treated as a Tribal-State compact
entered into under paragraph (3)."32 If
the State does not consent to the
proposed compact during the 60-day
period described. the mediator is
directed to notify the Secretary of the
Interior, who "shall
prescribe...procedures... under which
class III gaming may be conducted on
the Indian lands over which the Indian
tribe has jurisdiction.""
B. An Overview of Eleventh
Amendment Law and State
Sovereign Immunity: The States,
The Courts, and the Constitution
"[Tihe [Elleventh
[Almendment is one of the
Constitution's most bafing provisions
and. for its importance, one of the least
analyzed."I The text of the Amendment
provides:
The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity.
commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens
of another State. or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State. 5
In numerous decisions. the
Supreme Court has interpreted the
amendment as prohibiting federal courts
from taking jurisdiction over suits
brought in federal court against a state
by private citizens." Indeed. the Court
has long viewed the Eleventh
Amendment as raising a jurisdictional
bar limiting the power of federal courts
to entertain suits by private citizens
against unconsenting states.
Ratified in 1798. the Eleventh
Amendment was proposed and passed
in response to a particular case-
Chisholm i. Georgia." To put
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment
into perspective. one must recall the text
of Article III of the United States
Constitution. under which the judicial
power of the United States extends "to
Controversies.. .between a State and
Citizens of another State.. .and between
a State.. .and foreign States. Citizens or
Subjects." Article III confers
jurisdiction over disputes involving
diversity, as well as those involving
federal questions."
Chisholm involved state-
citizen diversity jurisdiction, as a citizen
of South Carolina brought suit against
the state of Georgia under Article III's
jurisdictional grant over "Controversies
between a State and Citizens of another
State..."40 In Chishohn, the Court held
that this state-citizen diversity clause of
the Constitution vested jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court over a State. as a
defendant, at the suit of a private citizen
of another State." "The Court's
decision in Chishohn provided a chorus
2 See 25 U.S.C. § 271 0(dX)(7XB)(ii).
2825U.S.C. § 2710(dX7)(B)(iii).
29 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7XB)(iv).
30 Id.
"
t See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(BX v).
3225 U.S.C. § 2710(dX7XB)(vi).
3 See 25 U.S.C. § 271 0(d)(7)(BXvii).
31 William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpreation ofthe Eleventh .Aniendment: A Consuiction ofin AJhfimatiive Graint ofJurisdiction
Rather Than A Prohibition Against Jurisdiction.. 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033, 1033 (1983).
"U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
36 Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1033 (citing e.g.. "Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors. Inc., 458 US. 670, 682 (1982) (characterizing
the issue before the Court as a "detennination ofiwhether the Eleventh Amendment in fact barred an exercise ofjurisdiction by the federal
court"); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (holding that "the Eleventh Amendment bars the statutory interpleader sought"), Edehnan
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (referring to the rule "that a suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid
from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment").
37 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
3 U.S. CONsT. art. m, § 2, cl. 1.
9 Fletcher, supra note 34. at 1034.
4o U.S. CONST. art. M. § 2, cl. 1.
41 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 420.
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of calls around the country for a
constitutional amendment."4 Thus, the
Eleventh Amendment was created. with
the unquestionable purpose of
countering the majority opinion in
Chishohn and overruling its holding.
However,
[tihe Supreme Court did not
directly address the issues of
whether the [Elleventh
[Al mendment forbade private suits
against statesby all private citizens.
out-of-state or in-state, and
whether private suits could be
brought under another head of
jurisdiction, until after the first
general original federal question
jurisdictional statute was adopted
in 1875.11
In 1890. nearly a century after
the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment, the Court in Hans v.
Louisiana" held that a Louisiana citizen
could not sue the state of Louisiana in
federal court for a violation of the
federal contracts clause." The Court
reasoned that if the Eleventh
Amendment barred suits by out-of-state
citizens. it followed that the framers of
the amendment intended to bar suits by
in-state citizens, as well." "Hans. or the
general principle prohibiting federal
court jurisdiction perceived to lie behind
it."' today generally stands for the
proposition that the Eleventh
Amendment forbids citizens from suing
states in federal court."
Hans's prohibition against
suing states in federal court was
considered too broad in a federal system
that seeks to control state action through
federal law in order to protect private
individuals. Therefore the Court
developed a set of fictions and
exceptions to avoid 1ansk full effect.
The most significant of these Court-
created fictions is the doctrine of Ex
parte Yoing. This doctrine. in certain
instances, provides for a lifting of the
Eleventh Amendment bar. in order to
allow a suit against a state officer. In
Young. the Court held that a federal
court could enjoin the Attorney General
of Minnesota from enforcing a state
railroad rate regulation statute. Since
the acts were illegal. they were merely
the acts of individuals acting without
authority from the state. If the state
could never authorize an
unconstitutional action, the official must
be acting in his or her individual
capacily.s0 In 1974. the Court clarified
this doctrine when in Edelman v.
/or(ian' the Court held that the doctrine
of Ex parte Young permitted suits for
prospective relief but did not permit suits
for retroactive relief. "which requires the
payment of funds from the state
treasun." 2
Apart from the Exparte Young
fiction. other means exist by which a
state may be sued in federal court. First,
a state may consent to be sued. Such
consent may be recognized in a variety
of state actions." Second. Congress
may abrogate a state's immunity to suit
when it acts pursuant to its powers as
enumerated in the Constitution. In
Fitzpatricky. Bitzer4 the Court held that
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment"
allowed Congress to abrogate the
immunity from suit guaranteed by the
Eleventh Amendment.56 Recently. in
4 2 Akhil Reed Amar, OfSovereigniand Federalisni, 96 YALF I.J. 1425, 1473 (1987).
4 Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1039 (citing Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470.).
4134 U.S. I (1890).
" Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1039 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. I).
4 6 Hans, 134 U.S. at 15 (1890). The Court stated:
The letter [of the amendment] is appealed to now [to support an argument that the state is liable to suit]... it is an attempt to strain the
Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits by citizens
of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had
appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a State from being stied by its own citizens in cases arising tuider the
Constitution or laws of the United States: can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the States? The supposition that it would is
almost an absurdity on its face. Id.
' Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1040.
48 Id.
4
' 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
50 Id.
5 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
SId. at 677.
s Fletcher, supra note 34, at 1042-1043. "A state's voluntary appearance in court and defense on the merits constitutes consent... A state
also may confer consent, although such statutes are narrowly construed: If the statute does not unambiguously grant consent to federal
courtsuit, a state will be held to have consented to suit only in state court-.. Finally, it is possible that a state may consent by voluntarily
engaging in activity regulated by the federal governnent..." A/.
4 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
* Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation." U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5.
"Fitzpairick. 427 U.S. at 445.
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Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.17 the
Court upheld congressional abrogation
of the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity through the Interstate
Commerce Clause." Third. while the
Eleventh Amendment protects states. it
provides no such protection to their
subdivisions. Thus. state subdivisions
such as cities, counties, and local school
boards are not immune from suit."
The scope of the Eleventh
Amendment. particularly congressional
power to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity, was again at issue in the
instant case. The Supreme Court
addressed whether Congress has the
power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Indian Commerce
Clause and whether the doctrine of Ex
parte Young permits suits against a state
official to enforce the good faith
bargaining requirement of the IGRA."
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion'
In the instant case. the
Supreme Court was presented with two
questions: (i) whether the Eleventh
Amendment prevents Congress from
authorizing suits by Indian tribes against
states for prospective injunctive relief to
enforce legislation enacted pursuant to
the Indian Commerce Clause and (ii)
whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young
permits suits against a state's governor
for prospective injunctive relief to
enforce the good faith bargaining
requirement of the IGRA?62 The
majority which consisted of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Scalia. Kennedy. and
Thomas. answered the first question in
the affirmative and the second question
in the negative. thereby affirming the
Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of
Seminole's suit.6' The Court held: (i)
although Congress. in enacting the
IGRA. clearly intended to abrogate the
States' sovereign immunity. the Indian
Commerce Clause did not grant
Congress that power. and therefore §
2710(d)(7) of the IGRA could not grant
jurisdiction over a state that does not
consent to be sued and (ii) the doctrine
of Ex parte Young may not be used to
enforce the good faith bargaining
requirement of § 2710(d)(3) of the
IGRA against a state official.
Seminole's first argument was
that Congress abrogated the States'
immunity from suit. through the IGRA.
The Court first found that the text of §
2710(d)(7) made it "unmistakably clear"
that Congress intended. through the
IGRA. to abrogate the States' sovereign
immunity from suit." Then, in response
to Seminole's suggestion in favor of
finding the power to abrogate because
the IGRA authorizes only prospective
injunctive relief rather than monetary
relief. the Court dismissed as irrelevant
the type of relief sought." The Court
also dismissed as irrelevant Seminole's
contention that the abrogation power
was validly exercised because the IGRA
grants the states authority over gaming
on Indian lands, a power that they would
not otherwise have."
The Court then narrowed its
focus to consider whether the IGRA was
passed pursuant to a constitutional
provision granting Congress the power
to abrogate. 7 The Court noted that
when previously faced with this issue, it
found the authority to abrogate under
only two provisions of the
Constitution.' In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzen6
the Court held that § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment allowed Congress to
abrogate the immunity from suit
guaranteed by the Eleventh
Amendment.70 The Court then
discussed the only other case in which
congressional abrogation of the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity was




"See Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552 (1900); Moor v. County ofAlameda, 411 U.S. 693,717-21(1973); Mount Healthy City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274. 280-81 (1977).
"Seminole, 116S.Ct. at 1121.
6' Rehnquist, CJ., delivered the 5-4 opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, J.T., joined. Id. at 1119.
62 Id. at 1121.
63 C1.
64 Id. at 1124. The Court, upon examination of the statute's text, concluded, "the numerous references to the 'State' in the text of §
271 0(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit." Id.
(emphasis added).
65 Id. The Court recognized, "[i]t would be a novel proposition indeed that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit to enjoin the State
itself simply because no money judgment is sought." A/. (quoting Corv v. White. 457 U.S. 85, 90 (1982)).
'Id. at 1125. The Court cautioned, "[tlhe Eleventh Amendment imnnmunity may not be lifted by Congress unilaterally deciding that it wvill
be replaced by grat of some other authority." Id. (citing, by analogy, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246-247 (1985)
("[Tihe mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State has consented to suit in federal court.")).
671Id.
68kC1.
69427 U.S. 445 (1976).
70 Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1125.
7' I. at 1126.
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Co.," which involved abrogation
through Congress's Interstate
Commerce Clause powers.
The Court agreed with Florida.
that rather than extend the rationale of
the Union Gas plurality to the Indiain
Commerce Clause. "Union Gas should
be reconsidered and overruled."" The
Court reasoned that the Court in Union
Gas had reached its result without a
rationale agreed upon by a majority of
the court.74 The Court stated that.
"[s]ince it was issued, Union Gas has
created confusion among the lower
courts that have sought to understand
and apply the deeply fractured
decision."" The Court then asserted
that Union Gas "also deviated sharply
from our established federalism
jurisprudence and essentially eviscerated
our decision in Hans.""6 The Court
further recognized that:
Never before the decision in Union
Gas had we suggested that the
bounds of Article III could be
expanded by Congress operating
pursuant to any constitutional
provision other than the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed. it had seemed
fundamental that Congress could
not expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds
of Article Ill."
In sum. upon reconsideration
of the decision in Union Gas, the Court
concluded "that none of the policies
underlying stare decisis require our
continuing adherence to its holding...
We feel bound to conclude that Union
Gas was wvrongly decided and that it
should be. and now is. overruled.""7
Upon consideration of
Seminole's alternative argument. that its
suit against the Governor of Florida
could go forward under the doctrine of
Ex parte Young. the Court held the
instant situation to be "sufTiciently
different from that giving rise to the
traditional Ex parte foung action so as
to preclude the availability of that
doctrine."7 9 The Court reasoned that
although "we often have found federal
jurisdiction over a suit against a state
official when that suit seeks only
prospective injunctive relief in order to
'end a continuing violation of federal
law'."' it could not supplement the
remedial scheme set forth in §
2710(d)(7) with a judicial'ly-created
exception." The Court concluded that
as Congress had chosen to impose a
significantly more limited liability than
that which would be imposed upon a
state officer under Exparie )oung. this
action was a strong indication that
Congress did not wvish to create such
liability under § 2710(d)(3) and the
Court was not free to rewrite the
statutory scheme. 2
Therefore, the Court
concluded that the Eleventh Circuit's
dismissal of Seminole's suit was proper.
The Court held that (i) Congress lacked
authority under the Indian Commerce
Clause to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity and (ii) the
doctrine of Exparte Young did not apply
to suits against a state official for
prospective injunctive relief to enforce




72 See supra note 3.
" Sentinole, 116 S.Ct. at 1127.
71 Id. The Court stated,
We have already seen that Justice Brennan's opinlion received the support ofonly three other Justices. Of the other five, Justice White, xvho
provided the fifth vote for the result, wrote separatcly in order to indicate his disagreement with the majority's rationale, and four Justices
joined together in a dissent that rejected the plurality's rationale. Id.





7 1 Id. The Court explained:
In overruling Union Gas today, wereconfimn that the background principle ofstate sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment
is not so epheineral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like the regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive
control of the Federal Govennent. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a particular area.
the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States. Id. at 1129-30.
The Court concluded by dismissing Souter's dissent as, "*in favor of a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own version




a Id. The Court stated that, "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and pennitting an action against a state oilicer based upon E
parte Young." Id.
8' Id. at 1 133.
93 Id.
* Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, acknowledging the thoroughness of the analysis of Justice Souter's dissent, but asserting that the
"shocking character" of the majority's decision was worthy' ofadditional comment. Id. at 1134.
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dissent first asserts. "[tihis case is about
power-the power of the Congress of
the United States to create a private
federal cause of action against a State.
or its Governor. for the violation of a
federal right."" Stevens referred to a
long line of cases. Chisholm.
Fitzpatrick, Union Gas. even Hans. "a
case the Court purports to follow
today." in which the Court recognized
that Congress has such power. He
noted. "[nlevertheless. in a sharp break
with the past, today the Court holds that
with the narrow and illogical exception
of statutes enacted pursuant to the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment., Congress has no such
power." 8 Stevens stressed that the
effect of the majority's decision was not
simply to negate the IGRA. but to
severely limit Congress's ability to
provide private individuals with a
judicial forum in which to confront the
states, with the following:
The importance of the majority's
decision to overrule the Court's
holding in Pennsylvania v Union
Gas Co. cannot be overstated. The
majority's opinion does not simply
preclude Congress from
establishing the rather curious
statutory scheme under which
Indian tribes may seek the aid of a
federal court to secure a State's
good faith negotiations over
gaming regulations. Rather, it
prevenits Congress from n.providing
a federal forum for a broad range
of action against States, from those
sounding in copyright and patent
law. to those concerning
bankruptcy. environmental law, and
the regulation of our vast national
economy.87
Further. Stevens found the majority
opinion to be "profoundly misguided".
calling it an "alTront to a coequal branch
of our Government [which] merits
additional comment."a
Stevens then argued that the
text of the Eleventh Amendment does
not apply to federal question cases. but
rather limits its application to diversity
cases. He emphasized, ". .. oie cannot
deduce from either the text of Article
III or the plain terms of the Eleventh
Amendment that the judicial power does
not extend to a congressionally created
cause of action against a State brought
by one of that State's citizens."89 In
answer to the majority's assertion that
precedent (Hans) compels that same
conclusion. Stevens disagreed. arguing
that Hans merely held that federal courts
should decline. as a matter of federal
common law. to entertain suits against
unconsenting States unless otherwise
directed by Congress. 0 Stevens
pointedly asserted.
The fundamental error that
continues to lead the Court astray is its
failure to acknowledge that its modern
embodiment of the ancient doctrine of
nothing to do with the limit on judicial
power contained in the Eleventh
Amendment." 9' It rests rather on
concerns of federalism and comity that
merit respect but are nevertheless. in
cases such as the one before us,
subordinate to the plenary power of
Congress."
Finally. suggesting that the
"misguided opinion" of the majority is
one of an advisory character, Justice
Stevens expressed confidence that
"Justice Souter's far wiser and far
more scholarly opinion will surely be
the law one day."9
C. Souter's Dissent94
Souter penned a penetrating
dissent to counter the majority's
decision, which he called
"fundamentally mistaken."5 Souter
began vith the following assertion:
In holding the State of Florida
immune to suit under the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act. the Court
today holdsfor the first time since
the founding of the Republic that
Congress has no authority to
subject a State to the jurisdiction
of a federal court at the behest of
an individual asserting a federal
right."
Souter then embarked on a lengthy
historical analysis. which cannot be
adequately summarized within the
constraints of this Note.9'
sovereign immunity "has absolutely First Souter engaged in a
8 5 Idat 1133.





h1(1. at 1142 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J.. concurring)).
92  l.
3 Id. at 1145.
94 Souter. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. A/. at 1119. Note, "In a rare occurrence, Justice David
H. Souter read parts of his dissent from the bench. I written fonn, it ran to 92 pages." David G. Savage, High Court Curbs Federal
Lawsuits .gainst the States, L.A. TIMrEs. March 28, 1996, at 1.
9Id. at 1145.
1 hl. (emphasis added).
9 Indeed, Souter's dissent has been described as, ...an extraordinary review of both constitutional history and Supreme Court precedents
with respect to sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment and the Hans decision, and it is worth reading simply as a model of the
persuasive use of legislative (and other) history for constitutional interpretation and not so incidentally - as history of the United States."
Stephen L. Kass and Jean M. McCarroll, Private Enforcenent A/ier 'Seminole'. N.Y.L.J.. Apr. 26, 1996, at 3.
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textual analysis" of the Eleventh
Amendment, concluding, "[tihe history
and structure of the Eleventh
Amendment convincingly show that it
reaches only to suits subject to federal
jurisdiction exclusively under the
Citizen-State Diversity Clauses."' Such
a reading of the Eleventh Amendment.
Souter held. comports with the Court's
practice. with the history of the drafting
of the Amendment, and with the
Amendment's language.' Thus. Souter
reasons. "[bjecause the plaintiffs in
today's case are citizens of the State that
they are suing, the Eleventh Amendment
simply does not apply to them. We must
therefore look elsewhere for the source
of that immunity by which the Court says
their suit is barred from a federal
court."'
Souter then looked
"elsewhere" for the source of that
immunity recognized by the Court-
Hans v Louisiana, addressing "the
mistakes inherent in Hans and.. the error
of today's holding.""o Souter first noted
that the Union Gas Court held that the
immunity recognized in Hans was
without constitutional status and was
subject to congressional abrogation. yet
the instant Court overruled Union Gas
and held the reverse.o'0 Souter asserted
that the Hans holding that the principle
of sovereign immunity derived from the
common law protects a state from
federal question jurisdiction when the
state is sued by its own citizen was
simply "wrongly decided, as virtually
every recent commentator has
concluded."" Souter further criticized
the majority with the following: "It
follows that the Court's further step
today of constitutional izing Hans's rule
against abrogation by Congress
compounds and immensely magnifies
the century-old mistake of Hans itself
and takes its place with other historic
examples of textually untcthered
elevations ofjudicially derived rules to
the status of inviolable constitutional
law."o' While Souter indicated he
would not overrule Hans. as a matter
of stare decisis. he maintained that "an
understanding of its failings. . .will show
how the Court today simply compounds
already serious error in taking Hons the
further step of investing its rule with
constitutional inviolability against the
considered judgment of Congress to
abrogate it."'0
Next. in a stem criticism of the
majority's decision, worthy of quotation
at length. Souter rebuked the Court for
its aggressive intervention, stating the
following:
It is.. remarkable that as we near the
end of this century the Court should
choose to open a new constitutional
chapter in confining legislative
judgments on these matters by
resort to textually unwarranted
common-law rules, for it was just
this practice in the century's early
decades that brought this Court to
the nadir of competence that we
identify with Lochner v. New York.
198 U.S. 45. 25 S.Ct. 539. 49 L.Ed.
937 (1905).
It was the defining characteristic of
the Lochner era. and its
characteristic vice. that the Court
treated the common-law
background (in those days.




abrogate the common law on these
economic matters as
constitutionally suspect... The
majority today, indeed seems to be
going Lochner one better... [in
effect] extending its reach so far as
to declare that the plain text of the
Constitution is subordinate to
judicially discoverable principles
untethered to any written
provision. 0o
Souter then discussed at length the
origin and purpose of the doctrine of Ex
parte Young. asserting that the doctrine
was applicable in the instant case and
that "the case could. and should. readily
be decided on this point alone." 109
Souter noted that adherence to this well-
established doctrine would have enabled
the Court to avoid altogether the debate
over congressional power to abrogate
state immunity under the Commerce
Clause or the Indian Commerce
Clause."
Souter concluded that absent
application of the doctrine of Ex parte
)oung, he would follow the Union Gas
9 In a footnote, Souter responded to the majority as follows, "lie majority chides me that the "lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh
Amendment is directed at a strawman." But plain text is the Man of Steel in a confrontation with 'background principlc[s and 'postilates
which limit and control'. An argument rooted in the text of a constitutional provision may not be guaranteed of carrying the day, but
insubstantiality is not its failing." Seminole. 116 S.Ct. at 1152.
"Id. at 1150. In a footnote to this statement, Souter contends, "The great weight of scholarly commentan agrees," citing numerous well-
known commentaries. Id.
' Id. at 1151-52.
1o' Id. at 1152.
'o2Id. at 1173.
"oa Id. at 1153.
"o Id. In a footnote, Souter referred to the "'reniarkahl[e] consisten[cyl' of scholarship on this point."
1051
'06 Id. at 1159-60.
' Id. at 1176-77.




decision. "in recognizing congressio
power under Article I to abrogate Ha
immunity."' In sum."[blecauseneit]
text. precedent. nor history supportsi
majority's abdication of o
responsibility to exercise the jurisdicti
entrusted to us in Article III," Sou
stated he would reverse the judgm
of the Eleventh Circuit."
V. COMMENT
As Justice Stevens suggest
this case is about power-the power
judicial review. Here. arguably, t
majority abused its judicial review poA
to usurp Congress's abrogation pow.'e
The majority defended its decision
the basis of "our established federali
jurisprudence,"" 2 while the diss
criticized the Court for its interventi
leading to an appearance
incompetence and. seemingly, a retu
to the Lochner era." Quite simply.
majority got it wrong. To reach
holding. the majority disregard
precedent and engaged in a susp
interpretation of the history of soverei
immunity. as well as of the history a
the text of the Eleventh Amendme
Further. the majority's effort to dism
the precedent of Union Gas
unconmincing.
First, the majority recogniz
that Congress was unmistakably cl
in its intent to abrogate the Stat
sovereign immunity through
2710(d)(7) of the IGRA. Indeed. t
majority referred to such legislati
intent as "indubitable.""' Then. t
na I maJority discussed prior cases in which by the Court. concerning
ins it found authority for congressional power to abrogate stat
[er abrogation under two provisions of the Arguably. politics. The
the Constitution. the Fourteenth Court has changed. Alt
iur Amendment and the Interstate Gas wias decided. Justi
ion Commerce Clause."' Rather than Blackmun, Stevens.. Bren
ter recognize that -ftlhere is no principled formed the plurality-plu
ent basis for finding that congressional instant case. Justice
powecr under the Indian Commerce O'Connor. Scalia, Ken
Clause is less than that conferred bv' the dissenters in Union Gas.
Interstate Commerce Clause."" 61 as added Justice Thoma
ed. Seminole argued. the majority made that majority.'12 '
'of argument obsolete by altogether Arguably the C
lhe abandoning its previous holding that the in the instant case rut
ver Interstate Commerce Clause granted "sound reason, history.,
rs. Congress the power to abrogate state strikingly uniform
on sov'ereign immunity."" commentary," as Sou
sm The majority defends its asserts."v The Court has.
ent conclusion that Union Gas was-wrongly more freedom to the st
on, decided and should be overruled by individual rights without
of dismissing the holding of Union Gas as Of course,. this poses
irn merely a plurality decision."' The environmental disputes
the majority also reasoned that never before suggested that "en
its the decision in Union Gas had the Court enforcement ... is m
ed suggested that Congress could abrogate threatened by Seminole
ect the states' sovereign imimunity pursuant body of regulatory lawv
gn to any constitutional provision other prominently and successi
nd than the Fourteenth Amendment and parties to monitor and
nt. that -fuln the five years since it was compliance wvith
iss decided. Union Gas has proven to be a requiremeints."'"2
i s solitary departure from established What are the
law"" Yes. Union Gas represented an instant decision? Clearly,
ced extension of congressional abrogation may not order a state t(
car powers. but the Court's rationale for costs pursuant to CE'
es' retreating from this extension is simply request of a private par
§ unconvincing. After all, isn't new, the holding of Union G
lie groundbreaking law always a solitary instant decision overn
ye departure at first? citizens are already feel







































"' Id. at 1185.
"
2 Id. at 1127.
" A. at 1176-77 (Souter, J., dissenting).




7 Id. at 1127.
118 i at 1128.
120 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1.
" Seminole, 116 S.Ct. at 1119.
"' See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
12' Kass and McCarroll, supra note 97, at 3.
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beginning to preclude CERCLA suits
against states."' Othcr environmental
laws. such as "the Clean Air Act: the
Clean Water Act: the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA); ... and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), that include private
enforcement and citizen suit provisions
allowing private action against states. .
.failing to comply with federal
regulations,""' are directly affected by
the Seminole Tribe decision. Under
Seminole Tribe, such citizen suits are
now unconstitutional since Congress
may not abrogate a state's
constitutionally protected sovereign
immumty.
Also significant in the instant
decision is the majority's decision to limit
the applicability of the Ex parte Young
doctrine itself. Recall that the majority
held that suits seeking injunctive relief
from violations of federal rights may
only use the Exparte Young doctrine as
an exception to the Eleventh
Amendment bar if Congress has not
already enacted a "detailed remedial
scheme," specifically designed for the
enforcement of those rights.126 Having
recently heard oral arguments in Idaho
v. Coeur d'A lene Tribe."' "the justices
have another chance to limit the Young
doctrine by narrowing the definition of
prospective reliefavailable to a plaintiff
against a state."12 1
Coeur dAlene Tribe concerns
ownership of a lake in Idaho. The
dispute arose when the Coeur d'Alene
Indian Tribe sued Idaho and various
state agencies and officials to quiet title.
asserting its ownership and jurisdiction
over Lake Coeur d*Alene. and several
rivers. The U.S. District Court for the
District of Idaho dismissed the suit
because of Eleventh Amendment
considerations and because the court
said the Tribe failed to state a claim to
the property at issue."' The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Eleventh Amendment barred the Coeur
d'Alene Tribe's claim against the state.
state agencies. and state officials to quiet
title in the reservation. but did not bar
claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief against state officials for future
violations of federal law.1"0 The issue
before the Court was whether the
presumption of state title removes this
case from the scope of the Ex porte
Young doctrine. as Idaho argued."'
Also. Idaho contended that the
declaratory relief sought was retroactive
in nature because it essentially attacks
the sovereignty the state held over the
land since it came into the union.12 The
Cocur d'Alene tribe insists that the relief
sought is prospective in nature."' As
one commentator recognized.
"depending on what the Court does. it
could put a lot ofcivil rights actions out
of bounds' by permitting declaratory
judgment actions to be characterized as
claims for retroactive relief"3" In any
case. the Court could once again
redefine the parameters of citizen suit
enforcement of federal environmental
laws. as it did in Seminole Tribe.
In the wake of Seminole Tribe.
what options are still available to enforce
environmental laws? Congress could
condition federal grants on the
requirement that states waive their
immunity from private lawsuits in federal
court. Also. federal agencies. such as
the Environmental Protection Agency.
may initiate suits against states for
environmental wrongdoing. or impose
administrative sanctions on states that
fail to comply with environmental
regulations.'" The doctrine of Ex parie
Young allows suits against the
responsible agency official by name
rather than suing the state itself."
VI. CONCLUSION
It is difficult to predict the
long-term effect of the Semninole' 7-ihe
decision with respect to environmental
disputes. One commentattr suggested,
"The decision in Seminole Tribe is
indeed about the power of the federal
courts to enforce federal law against
state government. It is also. however.
about the power of individuals to
vindicate their federally protected rights
in federal court."'" Clearly: the decision
jeopardizes and frustrates the efforts of
citizens to force states to comply with
federal environmental laws. By
embracing states' rights. to the
detriment of individuals' rights. the
"' See Prisco v. New York, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14944, at *45 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 8, 1996) (holding that as the Eleventh Amendment hars
CERCLA suits against a state, according to Seminole, a plaintiffhas no recourse against New York under the federal superfund law for the
actions of state environmental oflicials who allegedly polluted her land for profit under the guise of a "sting" operation.).
"2 Jeffrey Reynolds, Court Ruling Could Afect Environmental Iows, 1996 WL 8981217.
"2 Sentinole. 116 S.Ct. at 1133.
n2 1996 WL 604993 (U.S. Oral Arg.).
..s Richard C. Reuben, Justices Take the IP', 83 A.B.A.J. 44 (1997).
129 798 F.Supp. 1443 (1992).
"0o42 F.3d 1244 (1994).
'' 1996 WL 604993 (U.S. Oral Arg.).
132 Id.
" Id.
" Reuben, supra note 128, at 44.
'3s42U.S.C. § 9613.
'Of course, the reason why Congress included citizen-suit provisions in most federal environmental statutes was because governmental
agencies are often reluctant to bring suits against one another, due to a sort of a "don't bite the hand that feeds you" nentalit.
1' Martin A. Schwartz, The Eleventh Anendnent Decision. N.YL.J.. May 21, 1996, at 3.
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Seminole Trihe decision. seems to sound
a death knell for private enforcement of
federal environmental rights. Thus.
environmentalists would likely identify
with Justice Stevens and hope that
"...the better reasoning in Justice
Souter's far wiser and far more scholarly
opinion will surely be the law one
day."138
"
8 Seninole, 116 S.Ct. at 1145.
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